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CHOOSING FAME OVER FAMILY
Peter Mack, Geoff McNutt, John Vasuta and Michael Song∗

I. INTRODUCTION
The fame of two or more commonly owned trademarks is a
powerful weapon in the trademark owner’s enforcement arsenal if the
trademarks have a particular feature or element in common. Indeed,
recent developments in the law of trademarks suggest that the fame of
the senior user’s group of marks with a common element is a more
significant factor in a likelihood of confusion analysis than the senior
user’s ability to establish that it owns a “family of marks.”
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has defined a “family
of marks” as:
[A] group of marks having a recognizable common characteristic,
wherein the marks are composed and used in such a way that the
public associates not only the individual marks, but the common
characteristic of the family, with the trademark owner. Simply using a
series of similar marks does not of itself establish the existence of a
family. There must be a recognition among the purchasing public that
the common characteristic is indicative of a common origin of the
goods.1

The common characteristic can be a common prefix, suffix, or
syllable.2 The owner of a family of marks may rely upon the presence in
its marks of this common element to assert likelihood of confusion as
against another trademark that also contains the common element, even
if the other trademark as a whole is otherwise not similar in sound,
appearance or overall commercial impression to any single mark in the
∗
Peter Mack is a partner, and Geoff McNutt is an attorney with Foley & Lardner, Washington, D.C.
John Vasuta is Chief IP Counsel with Bridgestone Americas Holding, Inc., Akron, Ohio. Michael
Song is a student at George Mason University School of Law and a clerk with Foley & Lardner.
1. J & J Snack Foods Corp. v. McDonald’s Corp., 932 F.2d 1460, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
2. Spraying Systems Co. v. Delavan, Inc., 975 F.2d 387, 395 (7th Cir. 1992).

203

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2004

1

Akron Law Review, Vol. 37 [2004], Iss. 2, Art. 2
VASUTA1.DOC

204

4/5/2004 11:19 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[37:203

family.3
In deciding questions of likelihood of confusion, courts must often
place themselves “in the position of an average purchaser or prospective
purchaser in an attempt to understand what the normal reaction would be
to the marks as they are encountered in the marketplace or in
promotional and advertising material.”4 Thus, the proponent must show
by competent evidence: (1) that prior to the entry into the field of the
opponent’s mark, all or many of the marks in the alleged family were
used and promoted together in such a way as to create a public
perception of the common element as an indication of common source;
and (2) that the common element is distinctive.5
Because the proponent must prove use and promotion, evidence in
the nature of sales and advertising expenditures is often crucial to the
court’s determination of whether a family of marks exists.6 This
evidence, however, also may be used to show the fame of the marks.7
The fame of a mark is one of the factors that courts weigh when
determining the strength of the trademark, an important factor in any
likelihood of confusion analysis.8 Similarly, the establishment of a
family of marks may demonstrate the strength of the group of marks.9
Establishing a family of marks can be difficult because of the need
to show joint advertising of the family of marks, the distinctiveness of

3. See, e.g., McDonald’s Corp. v. McClain, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d 1274 (TTAB 1995) (finding that
the registration of “McClaim” for legal services infringed upon McDonald’s Corporation “MC”
family mark); Geoffrey, Inc. v. Stratton, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1691 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (finding that the
registration of “PHONES-R-US” infringed upon the “R US” family mark found in Geoffrey
Incorporated’s KIDS “R” US and TOYS “R” US”).
4. American Standard Inc. v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 200 U.S.P.Q. 457, 461 (TTAB 1978).
5. Marion Laboratories, Inc. v. Biochemical/Diagnostics, Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1215, 1218-19
(TTAB 1988). See also Polaroid Corp. v. American Screen Process Equip. Co., 166 U.S.P.Q. 151,
154 (TTAB 1970); J & J Snack Foods, 932 F.2d at 1463 (finding that “[i]t is thus necessary to
consider the use, advertisement, and distinctiveness of the marks” when determining whether a
family of marks has been established).
6. See Polaroid, 166 U.S.P.Q. at 154 (stating that “it has not been shown that the various
marks asserted to comprise said ‘family’ or, at least, a goodly number of them, have become
familiar or known in the photography field as a result of sales or constant exposure through
advertising and promotion”); Witco Chemical Co. v. Chemische Werke Witten G.M.B.H., 158
U.S.P.Q. 157, 160 (TTAB 1968) (finding that “we look primarily to the nature and character of
opposer’s advertising and promotional material and any evidence pertaining to purchaser reaction
thereto and exposure to the marks over the years” to establish a family of marks).
7. See Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods., Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
8. In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973).
9. Dictaphone Corp. v. Dictamatic Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. 437, 442 (D. Or. 1978) (holdinging
that “[t]he use of ‘Dictaphone’ together with other marks having ‘Dict-’ or ‘Dicta-’ as a prefix
strengthens Dictaphone’ and increases the likelihood of confusion between ‘Dictaphone’ and
‘Dictamatic[]’”).
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the common element, and the consumer’s association of marks
containing the common element with a single source of origin.10
Furthermore, a judicial finding that a family of marks exists does not
necessarily guarantee an adjudication that confusion is likely, as other
factors must also be weighed in this determination.11
Fame, on the other hand, is a dominant factor in a likelihood of
confusion analysis.12 Thus, because establishing a family of marks may
be difficult, courts and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
(“TTAB”) have recently focused their analyses on the fame of a group of
marks when determining likelihood of confusion, even in cases
involving a group of marks having a common element or common
unifying theme.
II. DIFFICULTY IN PROVING A FAMILY OF MARKS
Older cases appear hostile to the family of marks doctrine.13
Although more recent cases have been more objective and receptive to
the doctrine, proving the existence of a family of marks is challenging.14
Some of the reasons why courts have refused to apply the family of
marks doctrine include: (i) the lack of distinctiveness of the common
element; (ii) differences between the parties’ goods; and (iii) the lack of
conjoint advertising establishing a common ownership in the mind of the
consumer.
A. Distinctiveness of the Common Element
One of the most frequent reasons for courts to reject the existence
of a family of marks is the lack of distinctiveness of the common
element. This is because the family of marks doctrine is bottomed on
the notion that the common feature is a distinctive feature of each
mark.15 Thus, a common element that is merely descriptive or highly
10. Marion Labs, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1218-19.
11. In re E.I. DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361 (providing thirteen factors to help determine whether
a likelihood of confusion exists).
12. Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that FIDO-LAY for
dog treats was likely to be confused with FRITO-LAY for human snack food).
13. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
23:61 (4th ed. 2003); Creamette Co. v. Merlino, 299 F.2d 55, 59 (9th Cir. 1962) (stating that some
courts have “squinted” at the possibility of acquiring rights in a family of marks).
14. See MCCARTHY, supra note 13, at § 23:61.
15. American Standard Inc. v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 200 U.S.P.Q. 457, 461 (TTAB 1978). See
also Champion Int’l Corp. v. Plexowood, Inc., 191 U.S.P.Q. 160, 163 (TTAB 1976) (holding that
the nature and significance of the prefix FLEX- for flexible material “raises a question as to whether
[a family of marks] theory can be bottomed on such a term”).
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suggestive cannot serve as the distinctive feature of a family of marks.
For example, in Spraying Systems Co. v. Delavan Inc., the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the suffix JET for spray
nozzles was descriptive, such that there could be no family of marks
despite evidence of substantial sales and market share.16 Similarly, in
American Standard Inc. v. Scott & Fetzer Co., the TTAB held that the
prefix AQUA was highly suggestive for water faucets and thus could not
serve as a distinctive feature of a family of marks.17
Courts have also refused to find a family of marks when the mark is
commonly used in the trade. For example, in Servo Corp. of America v.
Servo-Tex Products. Co., the court held that the prefix SERVO is
commonly used in the industry as an abbreviation for servomotor or
servomechanism such that it could not serve to distinguish a family of
marks.18
In addition, if the common element is widely used for a variety of
products, courts may find that the common element is incapable of
establishing a family of marks. For example, in Creamette Co. v.
Merlino, the Ninth Circuit held that the suffix ETTES (or even ET or
ETTE) was so widely used for a variety of products and “capable of
being used with such an infinite variety of wholly dissimilar words that
[the court doubted] it could ever be a feature of a ‘family’ of marks to be
used on any line of goods.”19
Courts have found a family of marks, however, when the common
element is suggestive. For example, in Duffy-Mott Co. v. Borden, Inc.,
the TTAB stated that, while the suffix MATO for tomato drinks may “at
first blush” seem to be a little too suggestive, the suffix had been
“exploited . . . to enhance public recognition of this verbal feature as
indicating origin of certain beverages.”20 Similarly, in Reynolds &
Reynolds Co. v. I.E. Systems Inc., the TTAB stated, “[w]hile ACCU no
doubt has a suggestive connotation, it is not so highly suggestive as to

16. Spraying Systems Co. v. Delavan, Inc., 975 F.2d 387, 395 (7th Cir. 1992).
17. American Standard, 200 U.S.P.Q. at 461. See also Spraying Systems, 975 F.2d at 395
(holding that the suffix JET for spray nozzles was descriptive and the owner had not proven
secondary meaning such that there could be no family of marks despite evidence of substantial sales
and market share).
18. Servo Corp. of Am. v. Servo-Tex Prods. Co., 289 F.2d 955, 956 (CCPA 1961) (holding
that because SERVO is commonly used as an abbreviation for servomotor or servomechanism, it is
descriptive).
19. Creamette Co. v. Merlino, 299 F.2d 55, 59 (9th Cir. 1962); See also Quaker Oats Co. v.
General Mills, Inc., 134 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1943) (holding the suffix “ies” not exclusive to the
registered trademark of “Wheaties”).
20. Duffy-Mott Co., Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 201 U.S.P.Q. 846, 850 (TTAB 1978).
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impair its ability to serve as the basis for a family of marks.”21
In sum, because a party relying upon the family of marks doctrine
must establish that the purchasing public associates the common
element, as well as the whole trademark, with the owner of the family of
marks; this common element must be distinctive. Hence, a common
element which is merely descriptive, highly suggestive, or is commonly
used in the industry or on a variety of products, usually cannot establish
a family of marks.
B. Differences in the Goods
Another difficulty in asserting the family of marks doctrine occurs
when the marks containing the common element identify goods or
services that are different from the goods or services of the alleged
infringer. These differences undermine the recognition among the
purchasing public that the common element is indicative of a single
source of origin, and thus may preclude establishment of a family of
marks.
For example, in Witco Chemical Co. v. Chemische Werke Witten
G.M.B.H, the opposer’s marks containing the prefix WIT identified
various chemical compounds, including products in the paint industry,
petroleum industry, ink industry, and textile industry.22 The TTAB,
however, discounted many of the opposer’s marks because they were not
used to identify the same type of goods that applicant’s marks identified,
namely synthetic detergents.23 Thus, although the opposer sold many
products with the WIT prefix, although the opposer also sold synthetic
detergents under other marks not containing the common element, and
although the opposer owned one mark (WITCO) that identified synthetic
detergents, the TTAB held that this evidence was insufficient to
establish a family of marks.24
Some courts have also drawn narrow distinctions between related
goods to find that there is no likelihood of confusion, even if the
existence of a family of marks has been established. For example, in

21. Reynolds & Reynolds Co. v. I.E. Systems Inc., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1749, 1751 (TTAB 1987).
See also Marion Laboratories Inc. v. Biochemical/Diagnostics Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1215 (TTAB
1988) (holding that the suggestive prefix TOXI- for products related to clinical laboratory testing
for drugs may serve as a common element).
22. Witco Chemical Co. v. Chemische Werke Witten G.M.B.H, 158 U.S.P.Q. 157, 160
(TTAB 1968).
23. Id. at 161.
24. Id.
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Reynolds,25 the TTAB dismissed an opposition against an application to
register the mark ACCULINK for a computer program for asynchronous
communications use. The opposer had shown that it owned a family of
marks containing ACCU for computerized accounting programs.26 The
TTAB ruled against the opposer, however, on the ground that the
specific type of software for operational uses was sufficiently different
from software for accounting purposes as to negate a likelihood of
confusion.27
Similarly, in Consolidated Foods Corp. v. Sherwood Medical
Industries Inc., the TTAB held that, even assuming that the use of the
suffix SICLE for frozen confectionaries was sufficient to establish a
family of marks, a medical patient preparation sponge is such a
“radically” different product as to negate likelihood of confusion with
respect to the family of marks.28
In sum, because the consumer must associate the common element
with a common origin of goods, differences in the parties’ goods may
undermine reliance on the family of marks doctrine. Moreover, even if a
family of marks is established, tribunals may find that there is no
likelihood of confusion as between the family of marks and an allegedly
infringing mark because of differences in the parties’ goods.
C. Joint Advertising
Another difficulty in establishing a family of marks is the necessity
of showing conjoint advertising or promotion. This conjoint use and
advertising must also demonstrate that the consuming public associates
the common element with a single source of origin.
For example, in White Heather Distillers Ltd. v. American
Distilling Co., the TTAB stated that two marks bearing the common
word HEATHER for scotch whiskey, “can hardly be deemed a ‘family’
of marks within the accepted concept of the term, if for no other reason
than that the opposer has submitted no testimony, and the record fails to
indicate that these marks have ever been advertised together in any
manner apprised to project the impression that they all belong to the
same party . . . by reason of the common word HEATHER.”29
25. Reynolds & Reynolds, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1751.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1752.
28. Consol. Foods Corp. v. Sherwood Med. Indus. Inc., 177 U.S.P.Q. 279, 282 (TTAB 1973)
(holding that the evidence did not establish a family of marks).
29. White Heather Distillers Ltd. v. Am. Distilling Co., 200 U.S.P.Q. 466, 470 (TTAB 1978).
See also Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. CIBA-GEIGY Corp., 195 U.S.P.Q. 665, 667-68 (TTAB 1977)
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The tribunals have also held that, even if two or more of the marks
in the alleged family have been promoted together, the nature and
character of the advertising and promotional material must establish that
the consuming public would believe that any mark containing the
common element came from a the same source. For example, in Moore
Business Forms, Inc. v. Rogersnap Business Forms, Inc., the TTAB held
that a brochure and other individual advertisements only referenced at
most two of the marks in the alleged family.30 Thus, despite the alleged
use and promotion of sixteen marks, each containing the prefix SPEEDI,
the Board held that this conjoint advertising of only one or two at a time
did not establish a family of marks.31
Furthermore, even if two or more of the marks have been promoted
together, the intermingling of these marks with other marks missing the
common element may undermine reliance on the family of marks
doctrine. For example, in Dap, Inc. v. Flex-O-Glass, Inc., the TTAB
stated that, despite the joint promotion of two or three marks bearing the
alleged common element, the marks “have been so intermixed or
intermingled with other of applicant’s marks that do not contain the
[common element] as to seriously dilute or diminish any possible
consumer recognition that applicant possesses a family of . . . marks.”32
III. FAME LIGHTENS THE TRADEMARK OWNER’S BURDEN
Because of the stringent requirements for establishing a family of
marks, tribunals have sometimes focused on the strength of the group of
marks, rather than the establishment of a family. For example, in
Dictaphone Corp. v. Dictamatic Corp., the court stated, “[i]n
determining the effect of the use of the ‘Dicta-’ word family, it is not
necessary to rule on the viability of the so-called ‘family of marks’
doctrine. It is sufficient to say merely that the use of a trademark
together with a group of marks having the same prefix can enhance the
strength of the trademark.”33
(finding no “conjoint” use where the marks were not promoted together or in association with each
other).
30. Moore Bus. Forms, Inc. v. Rogersnap Bus. Forms, Inc., 163 U.S.P.Q. 303, 308 (TTAB
1969) (finding likelihood of confusion based on similarity of marks, not similarity to family of
marks).
31. Id. at 304.
32. Dap, Inc. v. Flex-O-Glass, Inc., 191 U.S.P.Q. 266, 270 (TTAB 1976). See also
Mallinckrodt, 195 U.S.P.Q. at 668 (finding that promotional pictures displaying three of the alleged
family marks together with eight other marks was insufficient to establish that these marks have
come to be recognized and associated together by the purchasing public).
33. Dictaphone Corp. v. Dictamatic Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. 437, 442 (D. Or. 1978) (stating that
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The strength of trademarks can often be demonstrated by another
factor that depends on evidence of extensive use, advertising, and
promotion; namely, the fame of the mark.34 Obviously, despite the
somewhat similar evidence needed to establish either a family of marks
or the fame of a group of marks having a common element, there are
differences between the two doctrines.
For instance, famous marks need not be unique, because the fame
or recognition may overshadow similar marks owned by others.35 In
addition, famous marks may enjoy an enhanced scope of legal protection
because consumers may come to associate the famous mark with diverse
products.36 “A strong mark . . . casts a long shadow which competitors
must avoid.”37
Some tribunals have relied upon the fame of a set of marks to lower
the bar for a party to establish either a family of marks or a likelihood of
confusion. While these cases have not always explicitly relied on the
fame of the marks as a determining factor, they have relied on such
evidence of fame to overcome some of the difficulties in asserting the
family of marks doctrine. These difficulties include the distinctiveness
of the common element or the application of a family of marks to
unrelated goods.
A. Distinctiveness of the Common Element
One way in which fame lowers the bar is to allow challenges based
on likelihood of confusion to a newcomer’s adoption of a descriptive or
commonly used element that also happens to be the unifying theme of

“[t]he use of ‘Dictaphone’ together with other marks having ‘Dict-’ or ‘Dicta-’ as a prefix
strengthens ‘Dictaphone’ and increases the likelihood of confusion between ‘Dictaphone’ and
‘Dictamatic[]’”).
34. See Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods., Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
35. See Tiffany & Co. v. Classic Motor Carriages, Inc., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1835, 1840-41 (TTAB
1989) (holding that the long use and advertising, and substantial publicity of the TIFFANY mark
established a likelihood of confusion despite the fact the TIFFANY is not a unique name); Polo
Fashions Inc. v. La Loren, Inc., 224 U.S.P.Q. 509, 512 (TTAB 1984) (holding that the sales and
advertising expenditures is evidence of the significance of the LOREN marks in the marketplace
and that it is more than adequate to rebut any inference of the third party uses of LOR for clothing
and toiletries).
36. Tiffany & Co., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1840-41 (holding that the famous TIFFANY mark for
jewelry was likely to be infringed by CLASSIC TIFFANY for automobiles); Harley-Davidson
Motor Co., v. Pierce Foods Corp., 231 U.S.P.Q. 857, 862-63 (TTAB 1986) (holding that due to the
long use and extensive promotion of the HARLEY-DAVIDSON mark and HARLEY or HOG
nicknames for motorcycles, a consumer would likely be confused with the mark HARLEY-HOG
for pork products).
37. Kenner Parker Toys Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 963 F.2d 350, 353 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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the senior user’s group of famous marks. This may occur through the
well-known doctrine of secondary meaning.
For example, in Aloe Crème Laboratories, Inc. v. Aloe 99, Inc., the
TTAB held that an opposer had established a family of marks
characterized by the prefix ALO, despite the common element being the
phonetic spelling of the generic name for an ingredient in the applicant’s
and opposer’s goods, namely aloe in cosmetic products.38 The Board
held that “because of the original, and for many years, exclusive
adoption by opposer of a long list of ALO prefixed marks . . . and
opposer’s long and extensive use and advertising of these marks, many
of which in concert, . . . it must be held that each of opposer’s ALO
trademarked products acquired a ‘secondary meaning’ denoting products
originating from opposer.”39 The Board also stated that this same
evidence not only showed secondary meaning, but also showed that the
opposer had established a family of marks.40
Although a showing of secondary meaning is not completely
synonymous with fame, these are similar concepts, in that both involve
proof of long-time use, extensive sales and significant advertising or
promotion. In sum, a showing of secondary meaning may allow even a
common element that is descriptive to form the basis for a finding of
likelihood of confusion.
B. Different Goods
Even if the goods identified by the group of trademarks are not
related to the goods identified by the allegedly conflicting mark, the
fame of a group of marks having a common element may also make it
easier to prove likelihood of confusion.
One example of a well-known family of marks is the MC and MAC
marks owned by McDonald’s Corp, the fast-food restaurant chain.41
Because of the fame of this group of marks, both the TTAB and the
courts have found a likelihood of confusion with respect to other marks
that also contain the MC or MAC component, even if the other marks
identify completely unrelated goods and services.
In McDonald’s Corp. v. McClain, the TTAB held that, while
“ordinary people would certainly not mistake legal services for fast food
chain restaurant services, we think some sort of a connection with
38.
39.
40.
41.
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[McDonald’s] would be falsely assumed because of the similarity of [the
mark MCCLAIM] to the members of [McDonald’s] famous family of
‘Mc’ marks.”42 Similarly, in McDonald’s Corp. v. Druck & Gerner,
DDS., P.C., the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New
York found that the mark MCDENTAL infringed McDonald’s family of
marks, despite the lack of any evidence of the proximity of the products
or the likelihood that McDonald’s will ever enter the field of dental
services.43 The court held that the McDonald’s family of marks was
strong due to the widespread familiarity of the public with McDonald’s
use of “Mc” language.44
Similarly, in International Diagnostic Tech., Inc. v. Miles
Laboratories, Inc., the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s reliance on
the fame of group of marks to establish a family of marks, even though
the goods of the parties were different.45 The court stated:
The board added that the evidence demonstrates ‘the renown of
opposer’s [Miles’] line of –STIX products acquired over many years of
use and through sales in the hundreds of millions of dollars’ and that
Miles ‘has also spent millions of dollars in advertising its products
through various media.’ Accordingly, it concluded that International’s
mark, used in connection with samplers employed with its diagnostic
equipment, so resembles Miles’ –STIX family of marks for Miles’
diagnostic reagent strips that confusion is likely.46

Although the court and the TTAB found that the different products
did have some striking similarities, the fame of the marks aided their
determination that confusion was likely despite the differences in the
parties’ goods.47
In sum, famous marks are entitled to a broader scope of protection
than other marks, and thus the protection extends to a wider variety of
products. Courts have applied this general principle to a group of
famous marks having a common element or unifying theme, overcoming
the difficulty in establishing a likelihood of confusion with respect to
other marks that identify unrelated goods or services.
42. McDonald’s Corp. v. McClain, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d 1274, 1276 (TTAB 1995).
43. McDonald’s Corp. v. Druck & Gerner, DDS., P.C., 814 F. Supp. 1127, 1135 (N.D.N.Y.
1993).
44. Id. at 1134. See also Quality Inns Int’l, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198, 221
(D. Md. 1988) (holding that there was a likelihood of confusion between MCSLEEP and
McDonald’s family of marks).
45. Int’l Diagnostic Tech., Inc. v. Miles Laboratories, Inc., 746 F.2d 798, 800 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
46. Id.
47. Id.
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IV. CHOOSING FAME OVER FAMILY
A. Courts
When analyzing single marks, courts often consider fame as a
“dominant factor” in a likelihood of confusion analysis.48 Courts have
also recently concentrated on the fame of a group of marks to establish
the strength of the group of marks, rather than to rely on the family of
marks doctrine.
For example, the case of Nina Ricci, S.A.R.L. v. E.T.F. Enterprises,
Inc.,49 involved an opposition to the registration of the mark VITTORIO
RICCI for various clothing and accessories, shoes, and retail store
services. The opposer owned several marks including NINA RICCI,
SIGNORICCI, and CAPRICCI for perfumes, toiletries, and cosmetic
products.50 The opposer also owned the mark MADEMOISELLE
RICCI for a wide variety of clothing and accessories for women.51
In the decision below, the TTAB found that the components
VITTORIO and NINA of the respective marks were obviously different
in sound, appearance, and connotation.52 The TTAB also accorded little
or no importance to the increasing sales of items under the opposer’s
marks.53 Although the TTAB also recognized that the common element
RICCI was identical in the respective marks of the two parties, the
TTAB nonetheless dismissed the opposition.54
The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the TTAB had failed to
consider the other marks of the opposer and their effect on the likelihood
of confusion analysis.55 Nina Ricci argued that these other marks
indicate that the RICCI suffix is a “unifying name” in the opposer’s
marks and the dominant and significant part of opposer’s marks in
identifying its goods.56 The Federal Circuit, without even discussing
whether or not the opposer had established a family of marks, concluded
that the opposer had demonstrated that there was a likelihood of
confusion between NINA RICCI “and related marks,” and the
48. Recot Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that FIDO-LAY for
dog treats was likely to be confused with FRITO-LAY for human snack food).
49. Nina Ricci, S.A.R.L. v. E.T.F. Enters., Inc., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1901 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
50. Id. at 1902.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1903.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Nina Ricci, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1903.
56. Id.
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applicant’s VITTORIO RICCI.57 In reaching its conclusion, the court
reiterated that “there is no excuse for even approaching a well-known
trademark of a competitor . . . and all doubt as to whether confusion,
mistake, or deception is likely is to be resolved against the newcomer,
especially where the established mark is one which is famous.”58
Similarly, the recent case of Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods.,
Inc.,59 began as an opposition to an applicant’s attempt to register the
mark POWERWAVE for amplifiers and power amplifiers. The opposer,
Bose, owned the mark WAVE for audio goods including, radios, clock
radios, audio tape recorders and players, portable radio and cassette
recorder combinations, compact stereo systems and portable compact
disc players, and the mark ACOUSTIC WAVE for loudspeaker systems
and music systems consisting of a loudspeaker system and amplifier and
at least one of a radio tuner, compact disc player, and audio tape cassette
player.60
In the proceeding below, the TTAB held that Bose failed to
establish the fame of its marks WAVE and POWER WAVE.61 The
TTAB also found that both marks, by including WAVE, were suggestive
of sound waves and radio waves.62 The TTAB also found the
applicant’s POWERWAVE mark to be suggestive and went on to hold
that the marks of the respective parties were different enough in sound
and connotation as to create distinctly different commercial
impressions.63
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the opposer’s
marks were “famous and entitled to broad protection.”64 Rather than
addressing whether the opposer’s marks formed a family, the court
stated, “[t]he presence of the root element WAVE upon this court’s
review, introduces a strong similarity in all three marks.”65 In particular,
the court held that the presence of WAVE in POWERWAVE conveyed
the same overall impression as WAVE in the opposer’s marks and that
the additional component POWER was insufficient to overcome this

57. Id. at 1903-04.
58. Id. at 1904 (quoting Planter’s Nut & Chocolate Co. v. Crown Nut Co., Inc., 305 F.2d 916,
924-25 (CCPA 1962)).
59. Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods., Inc., 293 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
60. Id. at 1369.
61. Id. at 1373.
62. Id. at 1377.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1376.
65. Bose Corp., 293 F.3d at 1378 (emphasis added).
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similar impression.66 Thus, in finding likelihood of confusion, the
Federal Circuit relied on both the fame of the marks—as well as the
common “root element” WAVE—rather than on the family of marks
doctrine.
In sum, both Nina Ricci and Bose illustrate the Federal Circuit’s
focus on fame rather than the family of marks doctrine in determining
likelihood of confusion. Both these cases involved marks with a
“unifying theme” or “common root element”; and yet, although the
family of marks doctrine appeared to be a potentially viable theory in
each case, the court did not even mention it.
B. TTAB
In the recent case of Bridgestone/Firestone North American Tire,
LLC v. Silverstone Berhad,67 the Board followed the Federal Circuit’s
lead in focusing on the fame of a group of marks rather than on the
question of whether the group of marks represented a family of marks.
This case involved a set of consolidated proceedings in the nature of
oppositions to a series of applications to register SILVERSTONE for
tires.68 The opposers owned the names and marks FIRESTONE and
BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE for tires, thereby creating a common
unifying theme characterized by the “STONE” suffix.69
The TTAB sustained the oppositions based not only on the fame of
the FIRESTONE and BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE marks and names
but also on the common STONE suffix.70 While the TTAB noted that
the opposers were “essentially asserting a family of “‘STONE’-suffixed
marks,” it did not analyze the case under the family of marks doctrine.71
Instead, the TTAB focused on the fame of the group of marks and
found a likelihood of confusion even though there were substantial
differences in sound, appearance, or meaning between the marks of the
respective parties.72 Also, while the applicant had introduced some
evidence of third party use of the component STONE in the general
automotive industry, the TTAB noted that these uses were irrelevant
either to the applicant’s or to the opposers’ uses of their respective marks
66. Id.
67. Bridgestone/Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC v. Silverstone Berhad, 2003 WL 1559659
(TTAB 2003).
68. Id. at *1.
69. Id.
70. Id. at *10 (also holding that SILVERSTONE was primarily merely a surname).
71. Id. at *9.
72. Id.
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for tires.73
The TTAB also relied on the opposers’ use of their STONE suffix
in a multi-brand marketing strategy – thus establishing conjoint
promotion and association.74 Nevertheless, rather than relying on the
family of marks doctrine, the TTAB instead focused on the fame of the
marks, which was clearly evident from the record.75 The TTAB
reiterated that there is “no excuse for even approaching the well-known
trademark of a competitor . . . and all doubt as to whether confusion,
mistake, or deception is likely is to be resolved against the newcomer,
especially when the established mark is one which is famous.”76
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the fame of a group of marks characterized by a
common element is a dominant factor in a likelihood of confusion
analysis, not only strengthening the mark, but also easing the burden in
proving likelihood of confusion. Recently, the courts, and particularly
the Federal Circuit, have tended to focus on the fame of a group of
marks having a common element rather than on a family of marks
theory. The TTAB has followed the Federal Circuit’s lead and has given
much weight to the fame of a group of marks that contain a common
element, without requiring the senior user to establish that it owns a
family of marks.

73.
74.
75.
76.
1992)).

Bridgestone/Firestone, 2003 WL 1559659 at *11.
Id. at *10.
Id.
Id. (quoting Kenner Parker Toys Inc. v. Rose Art Indus. Inc., 963 F.2d 350, 353 (Fed. Cir.
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